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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study focuses on IPO Initial Returns in Hot and Cold IPO Markets at the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) between the period of 2001 and 2005. This study uses a regression analysis where the first day 
IPO stock return is the dependent variable and a dummy variable that represents Hot and Cold IPO Markets is 
the main independent variabel. It is found that Hot and Cold Markets do exist at the IDX. More importantly, it is 
found that the difference in IPO Initial Returns between Hot and Cold Markets while controlling for other 
factors is 36.8%. The Investment Sentiment Hypothesis has been found to explain the existence of Hot and Cold 
Markets. The hypothesis implies that jumps in IPO Initial Returns during Hot Markets are due to the increase in 
the first day closing prices which are higher than the increase in the offering prices. The Monopsony Power 
Hypothesis and information spillovers across IPOs respectively may also provide alternative explanations to the 
phenomenon. Investment banker community in a small economy learns information from each other and, thus, 
has full information on the number of firms that will go public in the following period. Consequently, investment 
bankers have a high bargaining power of investment bankers in lowering the offering prices. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
Penelitian ini fokus pada besaran imbal hasil awal pada penawaran saham perdana (IPO) saat banyak 
jumlah perusahaan melakukan IPO (Hot IPO Market) dan pada saat sedikit jumlah perusahaan melakukan IPO 
(Cold IPO Market). Penelitian menggunakan analisis regresi yang mana imbal hasil hari pertama suatu saham 
perdana sebagai variabel bebas dan suatu variabel dummy yang mewakili Hot dan Cold IPO Markets sebagai 
variabel tidak bebas. Penelitian menemukan bahwa pada Bursa Effek Indonesia periode 2001 hingga 2005 
terjadi perbedaan imbal hasil perdana antara Hot Market dan Cold Market. Besaran imbal hasil awal setelah 
mempertimbangkan variabel pengendali adalah 36,8%. Penyebab fenomena ini dapat diterangkan pada 
hipotesis sentimen investasi yang mana besarnya imbal hasil perdana pada Hot Market sentimen investor sangat 
tinggi sehingga menyebabkan harga penutupan pada hari pertama melonjak jauh dibandingkan dengan harga 
penawaran perdananya. Di samping hipotesis sentimen investasi, penjelasan tentang hipotesis kekuatan 
monopsoni dan tentang bocornya informasi dapat juga menjadi acuan dalam menjelaskan fenomena ini. Bankir 
Investasi saling memberikan informasi sehingga mereka mempunyai informasi yang lebih lengkap sehingga 
memiliki daya tawar lebih tinggi untuk menekan harga perdana dibandingkan dengan perusahaan dalam proses 
penentuan harga saham perdana. 
 
Kata kunci: IPO, initial returns, hot IPO Market, cold IPO Market, Bursa Efek Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
Do IPO Hot and Cold …… (Doni S. Warganegara; Dezie L. Warganegara) 485 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The pricing of IPOs has attracted the academic communities as early as 1960s. Among the 
first studies in the subject is the one conducted by Reilly and Hatfield (1969). They find that investors 
in new stocks gain short-run abnormal returns ranging between 1 percent and 95 percent. Using more 
sophisticated statistical techniques, Ibbotson (1975) confirms the findings regarding the initial 
performance of IPO stocks and argues that the source of these abnormal returns is not the aftermarket 
inefficiency but rather due to downward biases in offering prices of new issues. Since then, 
researchers in the field have advanced models and test hypotheses to reveal these perplexing 
phenomena (Butler, Keefe, and Kieschnick, 2014). 
 
This study uses IPO data from the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) between the period of 
2001 and 2005 to investigate the IPO Initial Returns and factors correlate with them. It is found that 
Hot and Cold Markets exist in Indonesian stock market. The difference in IPO Initial Returns between 
Hot and Cold Markets while controlling for other factors is 36.8%. Lowry (2003) and Helwege and 
Liang (2004) note that the Investment Sentiment Hypothesis has been found to explain the existence 
of Hot and Cold Markets and the differential in Initial Returns during those two IPO market 
characteristics. With regard to higher IPO Initial Returns in the Hot Markets, the Investment Sentiment 
Hypothesis predicts that the first day closing prices and the offering prices during Hot Markets are 
higher than Cold Markets. To have jumps in IPO Initial Returns during Hot Markets, therefore, the 
increase in the first day closing prices must be higher than in the offering prices. 
 
This study also discusses the possibility that during Hot Markets, the first day closing prices 
increase while the offering prices decrease. The Monopsony Power Hypothesis as advanced by Ritter 
(1984) is used to explain the phenomenon. The Indonesia Stock Exchange is a small equity market and 
Indonesia is a small economy.  In a small community, the investment banker community has a very 
good idea about the numbers of firms that will go public in the following period. Armed with this 
information and given that investment bankers take institutional investors’ side, they will drive hard 
bargain to lower offering prices on behalf of those influential clients. As a result, in the Hot Markets, 
first day closing prices are higher due to a wild bullishness of investors and offering prices are lower 
due to a high bargaining power of investment bankers. 
 
The Monopsony Power Hypothesis and information spillovers across IPOs as advanced by 
Ritter (1984) and Alti (2005) respectively may also provide alternative explanations to the 
phenomenon. Investment banker community in a small economy learns information from each other 
and, thus, has full information on the number of firms that will go public in the following period. 
Consequently, investment bankers have a high bargaining power of investment bankers in lowering 
the offering prices. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two contains the literature review 
on IPO Initial Returns and their relationship with IPO Volumes. Section three discusses the data. 
Section four reports the empirical results using both univariate and multivariate analyses. The last 
section offers final conclusions on this study.  
 
Literature Review 
 
IPO Initial Returns 
  
The most cited explanations to the huge IPO Initial Return phenomenon are the ones that 
based on asymmetric information among participants in the IPO market; the issuer, the underwriter(s), 
and the investors.  Rock (1986) and Ritter (1984) contended that there were two kinds of investors, 
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completely informed and completely uninformed regarding the desirability of the shares being sold. 
Since the number of shares subscribed often far exceeds the number of shares available, uninformed 
investors face a potential “winner’s curse”. This means that they are only allocated by a sufficient 
number of shares in less desirable IPOs and by less than sufficient number of shares in more desirable 
IPOs. Uninformed investors get all of the shares they demand simply because informed investors do 
not want the shares. Facing with this systematic bias in the allocation of new issues, uninformed 
investors will only participate in the IPO market if new issues are sufficiently underpriced. 
Accordingly, the greater the uncertainty regarding the desirability of new issues, the bigger the amount 
of underpricing demanded by the investors. 
 
The existence of information asymmetry among investors may also lead to information 
cascade as in Welch (1992), Loughran and Ritter (2001), and Daniel (2001). Potential investors do not 
only use their own information to purchase new issue, they also pay attention to other investors' 
actions. Investors, based on their private information, may find some new issues to be desirable, but if 
they see no one buys the issues, they may cancel their purchases. To set off a cascading process, where 
all subsequent investors purchase new issues regardless of their private information, an issuer has to 
underprice an issue to induce the first few potential investors to buy. 
 
Information asymmetry arguments also have been used to explain a partial adjustment of the 
offer price to new information (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). Given that 
issuers want to get the full advantage of their ability to raise capital and underwriters want to 
maximize their underwriting spread, if there is strong demand, new issues will be set at higher offer 
prices. But if potential investors know that showing a willingness to pay a high price will result in a 
higher offer price, these investors must be offered something in return. Investment bankers 
compensate those investors in the form of underpricing that is resulted from the partial price 
adjustment instead of full adjustment. Because of this partial adjustment, IPOs of which the offer price 
is revised upwards will be more underpriced than those of which the offer price is revised downwards. 
 
The aforementioned asymmetric information arguments are far from complete in explaining 
the underpricing of new issues. They only address the necessity to be underpriced as demanded by 
investors and do not address the issues of contentment of underpricing by issuers and underwriters. 
Some researchers have attempted to use asymmetric information argument to explain the relationship 
between issuers and underwriters in the underpricing but the data do not support the arguments. The 
most cited arguments, however, in depicting the relationship between issuers and underwriters are the 
ones that based on the conflict of interest between underwriters and issuers. 
 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that if underwriters are given an authority by issuers to 
conduct share allocations, this discretion is not automatically be used in the best interests of issuers. 
Underwriters might intentionally underprice new issues and allocate these underpriced shares to their 
favored clients. In return, these favored clients will have businesses with underwriters and pay fees far 
in excess of the competitive rates. 
 
Using the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Loughran and Ritter (2002) 
contend that issuing firms were more tolerant of underpricing if they simultaneously learn that the 
offer price is higher than they originally expected. In short, the greater the increase in entrepreneurs’ 
wealth, the less aggressive the entrepreneurs in bargaining and negotiating over the offer price with 
underwriters. 
 
IPO Initial Returns and IPO Volumes 
 
One may characterize a market in several ways. For the IPO market, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) 
and Ritter (1984) characterize it as Hot and Cold. Using US IPO monthly data, they find that the IPO 
market follows a cycle with dramatic swings in the volume of new issues and the magnitude of the 
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initial returns. The hot market IPOs occur when in a particular period, the new issues offerings are in 
high volume and resulted in severe underpricing. One the other hand, the volume of new issues and 
the extent of the initial returns are low during the cold market IPOs. Using US IPO monthly data for 
the period between 1960 and 2000, Lowry and Schwert (2002) find high IPO initial returns in one 
month is followed by high IPO volume in the next month. They argued that more companies file to go 
public after learning that favorable information has lead higher initial returns for current offerings. 
 
Chemmanur and Fulgieri (1999), Stoughton, Wong and Zechner (2001), and Maksimovic and 
Pichler (2001) devised models, based on the information asymmetric and costly information gathering 
arguments, to explain the existence of hot and cold market IPOs. They argue that, in general, Hot 
Markets occur when several firms from particular industries discover new technology that lead toward 
increases in productivity. This favorable information is learnt by investors as those firms go public and 
triggers lower information asymmetry and less cost gathering. As a result, other firms in the same 
industry follow suit in going public. Thus, Hot Markets are the ones that have a large number of 
offerings by highly profitable firms from particular industries with greater investment plan than in 
Cold Markets. 
 
Lowry (2003) indicates that aggregate IPO volume was a function of both changes in firms’ 
demands for capital and changes in the level of investor optimism. Helwege and Liang (2004), 
however, find no evidence that firms in the Hot Markets are the ones that experience more 
technological innovations that resulted in increase in the demand for capital by these higher quality 
firms. 
 
Helwege and Liang (2004) instead argued that aggregate IPO volume is determined largely by 
shifts in the demand for new shares by investors. This Investor Sentiment Hypothesis posits that 
increase in the level of investor optimism causes the market paying more for firms than they deserve. 
Thus, a large number of firms find it optimal to go public during period of high sentiment and 
consequently those periods become hot periods for IPOs. In other words, the IPO market is inefficient 
such that during periods of high sentiment, investors may overvalue firms, inducing firms to enter that 
market at the same time so that IPO volume is high, while during periods of low sentiment, investors 
may undervalue firms, causing firms to delay the market entry so that IPO volume is low. In addition, 
Chemmanur and Jie (2011) even construct a model that firms going public in the hot market have 
lower productivity and profitability than that of in the cold market. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
 
The sample in this study consists of all initial public offerings conducted by Indonesian firms 
at the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) over a 5-year period between 2001 and 2005. A list of firms in 
this study is obtained from the IDX Annual Statistics. This publication allows having 78 IPOs. 
Prospectuses of these 78 IPOs are obtained from the IDX Financial Database and daily stock prices are 
obtained from the IDX Detailed Transaction History. The data needed for this study are as follows: (1) 
listing date, the offer price and the first day closing price of each IPO, (2) the length of the period from 
its establishment as a going concern to its IPO year, (3) the latest amount, in Indonesian Rupiahs 
(IDR), of total assets prior to its IPO, (4) the industry at which the firms in the sample operate. The 
Indonesia Stock Exchange classifies each firm into 9 industry groups and it further classifies each firm 
into 40 industries. The complete list of those IPO firms and their industry group across the sample 
period can be seen on Table 1 below: 
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Table 1 IPO firms and Industry Groups in 2001-2005 Periods 
  
Industry Groups 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Basic Industry and Chemicals 5 2 - 1 - 8 
Miscellaneous Industry 2 1 - 1 1 5 
Consumer Goods Industry 3 2 1 - - 6 
Property, Real Estate, and Building  3 - - 1  4 
Infrastructure, Utilities, and Transportation 1 - 1 1 2 5 
Finance 4 8 3 3 4 22 
Mining 1 2 1 1 - 5 
Agriculture - 1 - 1 - 2 
Trade, Service, and Investment 11 6 - 3 1 21 
Total 30 22 6 12 8 78 
 
 
Table 1 shows that during the period of 2001-2005, the IPOs in Indonesia were mostly offered 
by firms from two Industry Groups; Finance and Trade, Service and Investment. The IPOs from these 
two Industry Groups count for more than 55% (43 of 78 IPOs) of the total IPOs during the period. The 
least number of IPOs comes from the Agriculture Industry Group, which are 2 of 78 IPOs. 
 
It also can be seen in Table 1 that it is more than 65% (52 of 78 IPOs) of the total IPOs were 
conducted in the year of 2001 and 2002. In the year of 2003 and 2005, however, there are only 6 and 8 
IPOs occurred, respectively. The Jakarta Stock Exchange is a small stock market. On average, there 
was around 1 IPO in each month during the sample period. In contrast, the US market between 1960 
and 2000 saw around 2 IPOs, on average, occurred in each trading day. 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
N: 78 IPO Firms 
Variables Mean Min. Max Std. Dev. 
Firm Age (year) 16.60 2 144 21.78 
Size (IDR 000) 4,832,268 2,001 250,395,000 29,816,537 
IPO Initial Returns (%) 46 -33 480 75 
Firm Age is defined as the length of period from the establishment as a going concern to the IPO year. Size is the value of the total assets 
prior to the IPO expressed in Indonesian Rupiahs (IDR). IPO Initial Returns is the percentage difference between the offering price and 
the closing price of the first trading day. 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of some variables used in this study. The average age of 
the sample firms is 16.60 years with the maximum and minimum ages of 144 years and 2 years, 
respectively. The average size (total asset value in Indonesian Rupiah-IDR) of the sample firms is 
around IDR 4.832 billions with the maximum and minimum sizes of IDR 250,395 billion and IDR 2 
billion, respectively. There are 7 state-owned enterprises among the sample firms. A firm that has been 
in existence for 144 years is Perusahaan Gas Negara, a state-owned natural gas distributing firm. 
Based on longevity, three of the four oldest firms are state-owned enterprises. Similarly, a firm that 
has the maximum size is Bank Mandiri, a state-owned banking firm. Again, based on size, three of the 
four largest firms are state-owned enterprises. 
 
Numerous studies have reported the underpricing of new issues that result in large average 
initial returns, the average price changes ratio measured from the offering price to the closing price at 
the end of the first day, in every nation across the globe. Table 2 also shows the existence of 
underpricing phenomenon at the IDX from the period of 2001 to 2005. The average initial return of 
these 78 IPOs is 46%. The highest initial return is 480% occurred in the year 2001 when Ryane 
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Adibusana, a garment firm, went public. The lowest initial return is -33% occurred in the year 2002 
when Kresna Graha Sekurindo, a financial security firm that included underwriting as its one of its 
businesses, went public. As mentioned earlier, the year 2001 and 2001 were the years with the 
heaviest IPO volumes. It is more than 65% of the total IPOs in the sample were conducted during 
those years.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
Figure 1 presents the initial returns of every IPO in this study. It shows that initial returns are 
quite varied across the sample firms and periods. The initial returns are relatively higher for IPOs in 
2001 and 2002. In contrast, the initial returns are relatively lower for IPOs in 2003, 2004, and 2005. 
 
It can also be seen in Figure 1 that the initial returns of these two sub-periods have been set 
apart even from their first IPOs. The first IPOs in year 2001 and 2002 consistently have higher initial 
returns than in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Notice also in Figure 1 that the IPO volumes across the periods 
are varied. The IPO volume in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 are 30, 22, 6, 12 and 8 IPOs 
respectively. 
 
The relationship between IPO Initial Returns and Volumes can be clearly demonstrated in 
Figure 2. It shows that the relationship between these two variables is monotonically positive 
throughout the sample period such that the highest volume is paired with the highest returns, the 
second highest volume coincides with the second highest returns, and so on. 
 
The positive monotonic relationship between the Initial Returns and the IPO Volumes in this 
study confirms the findings of Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984) that the IPO market can be 
characterized by Hot and Cold Markets. The Hot (Cold) market IPOs occur when in a particular period 
the new issues offerings are in high (low) volume and resulted in severe (less) underpricing. In the 
spirit of this IPO market characterization; this study defines the year of 2001 and 2002 as the Hot 
Market, while the years of 2003, 2004 and 2005 are labeled as the Cold Market. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to gauge the normality assumptions 
of the IPO Initial Returns in this study. It can be seen that the test significantly rejects the Null 
Hypothesis that the IPO Initial Returns are normally distributed. The result of the test suggests one 
cannot put faith on parametric tests on the data used in this study. For the sake of completeness, 
however, the results of parametric tests are reported a long side with its non-parametric counterparts. 
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Initial Returns is the price changes ratio measured from the offering price 
to the closing price at the end of the first day of each IPO in the sample period. 
 
Figure 1 Initial Returns of each 78 IPOs in the sample 
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Table 4 shows the mean and median of the IPO Initial Returns during the Hot and Cold 
Markets. It can be seen that both mean and median of the IPO Initial Returns during the Hot and Cold 
Markets are positive, an indication that regardless of the IPO market characterization, IPO 
underpricing exists at the IDX. More importantly, the results of the tests on the differences in the 
Initial Returns in both markets support the notion the Initial Returns during the Hot Markets are higher 
than the Cold Markets. The Null Hypothesis that the observed IPO Initial Returns in Hot Markets have 
no difference than in Cold Markets are rejected at the one percent level by the 2-independent sample t-
test and its non-parametric counterpart, the Mann Whitney U test.  
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Figure 2 Average Initial Returns and IPO Volume 
 
As mentioned earlier, the IDX is a small stock market. On average, there is only around 1 IPO 
occurs in each month. To analyze the effect of the months of the year to the IPO Initial Returns, this 
study grouped the IPOs based on which month of the year they occur. Figure 3 shows the Initial 
Returns of IPOs as grouped into particular calendar months of their occurrence. It can be seen that the 
busiest month during 2001-2005 is July (18 IPOs) followed by November (11 IPOs). In contrast, the 
quietest month during the period is February (0 IPO) followed by August (1 IPO). Inspection of the 
graph reveals the Last Quarter of the year (October-November) exhibit the highest average initial 
returns than the First Three Quarters.  
 
Table 3 Results of Goodness of Fit Tests 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistics p-value 
IPO Initial Returns 1.83 0.00 
Monthly Average IPO Initial Returns 1.06 0.21 
Initial Returns are calculated as the difference between the offer price and the first day closing price  
for each IPO. Monthly Average Initial Returns are the average initial returns  
of all IPOs occurred during the calendar months of the sample period. 
 
 
Table 3 earlier also presents the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to gauge the normality 
assumptions of the Monthly Average IPO Initial Returns in this study. It can be seen that the test 
cannot reject the Null Hypothesis that the Monthly Average IPO Initial Returns are normally 
distributed. The results of the tests suggest one should use parametric tests on the data used in this 
study. For comparison, however, the results of non-parametric tests are also reported in this study.  
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Table 4 Tests for Differences in Initial Returns 
Hot Market (HM) and Cold Market (CM) 
(NHM=52, NLM=26) 
 
 
Initial Returns 
Hot Market   Cold Market   
Mean 0.61 0.15 
Median 0.35 0.18 
Standard Deviation 0.87 0.09 
2-independent sample t-statistics  
(1 tailed p-value) 
2.67 
(0.01) 
Mann-Whitney U statistics 
(1 tailed p-value) 
417.50 
(0.01) 
Initial Returns are calculated as the difference between the offering price and the first day 
closing price for each IPO. Hot market (HM) is defined as the year of 2001 and 2002, while 
Cold Market (CM) is defined as the year of 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
 
 
Recall that the result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test earlier is that one cannot reject that the 
Monthly Average IPO Initial Returns are normally distributed. In this part, therefore, the t-test is more 
reliable in detecting differences in the Monthly Average Initial Returns. The t-test in this instance 
confirms that the Monthly Average Initial Returns during the First Three Quarter are significantly less 
than the Last Quarter.   
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  Monthly Average Initial Returns is the average price changes ratio measured from the offering price  
to the closing price at the end of the first day of all IPOs in each calendar month during the sample period 
 
Figure 3 Monthly Cumulative Average IPO Initial Returns and IPO Month 
 
 
Table 5 contains the results of the last univariate tests in this study. The 2-independent sample 
t-test significantly rejects the Null Hypothesis at the 5% level that the Monthly Average Initial Returns 
during the First Three Quarter are equal or higher than the Last Quarter. The non-parametric test, 
however, only results in weakly rejection at the 10% significance level.  
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Table 5 Tests for Differences in Initial Returns 
The First Three Quarters (FTQ) and The Last Quarter(LQ) 
(NFTQ=53, NLQ=25) 
 
 
Cumulative Average Initial Returns 
The First Three 
Quarters   
The Last Quarter   
Mean 0.35 0.66 
Median 0.17 0.24 
Standard Deviation 0.51 1.05 
2-independent sample t -statistics  
(1 tailed p-value) 
2.18 
(0.03) 
Mann-Whitney U statistics 
(1 tailed p-value) 
6.00 
(0.09) 
Initial Returns are calculated as the difference between the offer price and the first day closing 
price for each IPO. These initial Returns are grouped based on which quarter the 
corresponding IPO taken place. 
 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
The t-test and the Mann-Whitney U tests are univariate tests that have a shortcoming of their 
inability to control other factors that may have important influences on the tests outcome. To control 
for other factors while testing a particular factor, therefore, a multiple regression analysis is utilized as 
follows:   
 
IRi = β0 + β1Volumei + β2Quarteri + β5Marketi + β3Sizei + β4Agei + εi 
 
Where:  
IRi =  Initial returns of IPO stock i, which is the difference between day 1closing price and 
offering price  
Volumei =  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO year is 2001 or 2002, and zero 
otherwise  
Quarteri =  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO i taken place in Quarter 4, and zero 
otherwise  
Marketi =  Returns of IDX Market Index between day -1 and day -16 of IPO i.  
Sizei =  Natural log of total assets of IPO Firm i, one year before going public.  
Agei  =  Natural Log of IPO firm i’s Age. 
εi =  An error term. 
 
The equation above states that that there are five factors that may explain the variance in the 
IPO Initial Returns of this study. The first three factors are a dummy variable (Volume) that represents 
the Hot and Cold Markets, a dummy variable (Quarter) that represents the market timing of an IPO, 
such that whether or not an IPO is conducted in the last quarter of each calendar year, and finally the 
market returns of the last 15 days (Market) of each IPO in the sample. The last two factors are the 
natural logs of total assets and firm age that represent Size and Age of IPO firms respectively. In 
general, the first three factors describe the market conditions when each IPO in this study is being 
carried out. The last two factors, Size and Age, represent the characteristic of IPO firms that may 
influence the perceived risks of new issues individually. Table 6 presents the estimation results for the 
multiple regression analysis. 
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Table 6 Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
           N= 78 IPO FIRMS 
Independent 
Variables Coefficients T-Stat. P-Value 
Constant 1.984 1.756 0.04 
Volume 0.368 3.059 0.00 
Quarter 0.380 1.754 0.04 
Market -1.608 -1.003 0.16 
Size -0.073 -1.556 0.06 
Age 0.002 0.024 0.49 
F-Stat (P-Value) 3.21 (0.01) 
Adjusted R2 0.1251 
The  model is IRi = β0 + β1Volumei + β2Quarteri + β5Marketi + β3Sizei + β4Agei + εi.  IRi = Initial 
returns of IPO stock i, which is the difference between day 1 closing price and offering price. 
Volumei = A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO year is 2001 or 2002, and zero 
otherwise. Quarteri = A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO i taken place in Quarter 4, 
and zero otherwise. Marketi = Returns of IDX Market Index between day -1 and day -16 of  IPO i.  
Sizei = Natural log of total assets of IPO Firm i, one year before going public. Agei = Natural Log of 
IPO firm i’s Age. εI = An error term. The t-statistics use White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors.   
 
Table 6 shows the F-test which confirms the notion that at least one of the independent 
variables has an effect on the dependent variable. The rejection of the Null is significant at a 1% level. 
The R-squared, on the other hand, is just 18.19% and it is quite low even for cross sectional analysis. 
When the sample size and the number of independent variables are taken into considerations, the 
explanatory power of the independent variables is dropped to 12.51%. Judging from the magnitudes of 
the adjusted R-squared, there is plenty of variance in the dependent variable that is unexplainable by 
the independent variables in the model. 
 
Table 6 shows that Volume has the expected sign and significant at less than a 1% level. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is relatively big such that the difference in the IPO Initial Returns 
between Hot and Cold Markets is as large as 36.8%. This study confirms the findings of Ibbotson and 
Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984) that the hot (cold) IPO markets always coincide with severe (less) 
underpricing. The same thing also happens to Quarter as it has the expected sign and significant at less 
than a 5% level. The magnitude of the coefficient is even slightly bigger than Volume, such that the 
difference in the IPO Initial Returns occur in the Last Quarter of a calendar year is 38 % higher than in 
the First Three Quarters. The finding that later issuer provide higher initial returns (lower quality IPO 
firms) are in contrast with the one in Çolak and Günay (2011) that the later issuers in an IPO cycle are 
the best firms and the first issuers are of lower quality. They argue that the best firms wait to learn the 
situations in the IPO market before going public. 
 
The current literature in IPO has a tendency to explain separately between IPO Initial Returns 
and Volume. However, since these two IPO phenomena always occur side by side, any hypothesis 
advanced should be able to explain both IPO Initial Returns and Volume at the same time. So far 
Lowry (2003) and Helwege and Liang (2004) have found that it is the shift in level of investor 
optimism that cause the changes in IPO Volume. The Hot Market is caused by investors increase their 
demand in IPO stocks. This increased demand might cause plenty of firms to go public in the same 
time. A wild bullishness rallies first day closing prices. The level of offering prices during the Hot 
Market, on the other hand, may need to be explained further. 
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Based on the reasoning of the Investor Sentiment Hypothesis, the level of offering price in the 
Hot Market is at least as high as in the Cold Market.  Issuing firms might take advantage of the 
increased demand by setting higher offering prices. Investment bankers may not have any objection to 
these increased offering prices as long as they are accommodated by the increase in demand of new 
issues by investors. 
 
There is a possibility, however, that the levels of offering prices are higher in the Hot Market 
than in the Cold Market. This possibility can best be explained by using the Monopsony Power 
hypothesis or information spillovers across IPOs as advanced by Ritter (1984) or Alti (2005) 
respectively. IDX is a small equity market and Indonesia is a small economy.  Almost all of listed 
firms have headquarters in the capital city of Jakarta and, more importantly, all investment bankers 
reside in Jakarta. 
 
In a small community, news travel fast. The investment banker community has a very good 
idea about the number of firms that will go public in the following period. Armed with this 
information, investment bankers would drive hard bargain to lower offering prices. In this line of 
explanation, investment bankers are assumed to be on the side of institutional investors because they 
conduct businesses with institutional investors on regular basis while IPO might be viewed as a one 
time deal. Therefore, in the Hot Market, first day closing prices are higher due to a wild bullishness of 
investors and offering prices are lower due to a high bargaining power of investment bankers. 
 
The Monopsony Power Hypothesis can also be extended to explain the findings in this study 
that the IPO Initial Returns occur in the Last Quarter of a calendar year are higher than in the First 
Three Quarters. As a year closes to end, institutional investors conduct window dressing on their 
portfolios to show that the portfolios have done well under their management.  This necessity would 
be translated into demand for further lowering offering price and communicated to investment bankers 
during road shows of IPOs. In turn, underwriters press issuing firm harder to get lower offering prices. 
Therefore, regardless it is Hot or Cold Market, the year-end IPO Initial Returns, on average, are higher 
than in the other parts of calendar year. 
 
Table 6 earlier also shows the result of the tests on Market, Size and Age. Market is used to 
represent the latest condition on the market before issuing firms and investment bankers set offering 
prices. It is found to be insignificant at conventional levels. Daniel (2002) has raised doubt in the 
sensitivity of an offering price to the latest movement in the market. The finding of this study that 
Market is not statistically significant confirms his expectation. 
 
Size and Age, on the other hand, represent risks of issuing firms. These two variables may be 
used by investors to solve information asymmetric problem surrounding the offerings. Of these two 
variables, only Size is found to have expected sign and be weakly significant at a 10% level. Investors 
perceive larger firms, as compared to smaller firms, present fewer risks because they possess more 
ways and means to flourish in the market place. Therefore, the larger the size of IPO firm, the less is 
the underpricing. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study is an attempt to investigate factors that correlate with the IPO Initial Returns at the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange. Those factors are IPO Volume, Quarter, Lag Market Returns, Size and Age.  
The first three factors describe the market conditions when each IPO in this study is being carried out. 
The last two factors, Size and Age, represent the characteristic of IPO firms that may influence the 
perceived risks of new issues individually. Of these 5 factors, it is found that only Volume, Quarter 
and Size to have the expected signs and statistically significant at conventional levels. 
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Judging from the magnitudes of the coefficients, IPO Volume and Quarter in which an IPO 
taken place are the most notable. They are .368 and .38 respectively, which means the difference in 
IPO Initial Returns between Hot and Cold Markets (the Last Quarter and the First Three Quarters) 
while keeping the other factors constant is 36.8% (38%). The Investment Sentiment Hypothesis has 
been found to explain the existence of Hot and Cold Markets, which is the increase in the first day 
closing prices and in the offering prices (Lowry, 2003; Helwege and Liang, 2004).  As long as the 
increase in the first day closing prices is higher than in the offering prices, there will be spikes in IPO 
Initial Returns during Hot Markets. 
 
This study also discusses the possibility that during Hot Markets, the first day closing prices 
increase while the offering prices decrease. The Monopsony Power Hypothesis as advanced by Ritter 
(1984) and Alti (2005) offers an alternative venue in explaining the possibility such that in a small 
stock market like the Indonesia Stock Exchange, investment bankers have full information regarding 
the number of firms to go public in the next period. This information is used by investment bankers to 
demand issuing firms for lower offering prices on behalf of their influential investors. Further studies 
should be directed to reveal the characteristics of the components that made up IPO Initial Returns 
during Hot and Cold Markets and across periods. Finding their characteristic will enrich the literature 
in the field. 
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